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REQUIREMENT CONTRACTS AND THE DOCTRINE OF MUTUALITY-
PROPOSED APPROACH OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
G. Loewus & Co., a New Jersey wine distributor, sold its bottling plant
in 1942 and restricted its business to the wholesaling of bottled wines. At the
same time they agreed to buy all their requirements of certain brands of wine
from the Vischia Bottling Co., the price to be dependent upon the cost of bulk
wine to the latter. Vischia refused to supply when wartime price-fixing caused
a scarcity of bulk wine, and Loewus sued for damages. The New Jersey
Supreme Court affirmed a trial court judgment for Vischia, holding that the
contract lacked mutuality because Loewus was entering a new business in
1942, the requirements of which were not ascertainable with sufficient
certainty. G. Loewus & Co. v. Vischia, 65 A. 2d 604 (N. J. 1949).
Under the "mutuality" doctrine1 courts have often declared that contracts
to furnish the requirements of an established producing concern,, such as a
manufacturing, utility, or transportation company, are valid ;2 while contracts
to furnish the requirements of a non-producing business, such as a wholesaler,
retailer, distributor, jobber, or any new concern, are void.3 The usual explana-
1. As stated in Ash v. Noble Oil & Gas Co., 96 Okla. 211, 217, 23 Pac. 175, 179
(1923), "'mutuality' as applied to a contract means consideration." And, as pointed out
in Royal Brewing Co. v. Uncle Sam Oil Co., 205 Mo. App. 616, 617, 226 S. W. 656, 657
(1920), "The rule in respect to 'mutuality of contract' is that the contract must obligate
each party to do something in consideration of what the other does, or is to do, 4nd a
contract which purports to bind one party to do something and leaves the other free
to do, or not to do, as he may please, is void for lack of mutuality." See Patterson,
"Illusory" Promises and Promisor's Options, 6 IowA L. BULL. 209 (1921), reprinted in
Selected Readings on the Law of Contracts 415, et seq. ) 1931) ; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 37 (rev. ed. 1937) ; ANSON, CONTRACTS § 319 (Turk ed. 1929). See also Jordan v. In-
dianapolis Water Co., 159 Ind. 337, 64 N. E. 680 (1902).
2. Brightwater Paper Co. v. Manadock Paper Mills, 151 F.2d 869 (1st Cir. 1947);
Walker Mfg. Co. v. Swift, 200 Fed. 529 (5th Cir. 1912); Lima Locomotive & Machine
Co. v. National Steel Castings Co., 155 Fed. 77 (6th Cir. 1907) ; Manhattan Oil Co. v.
Richardson Lubricating Co., 113 Fed. 923 (2d Cir. 1902) ; Long Beach Drug Co. v. U. S.
Drug Co., 13 Cal.2d 168, 88 P.2d 698 (1939) ; Lincoln Mining Co. v. Board of Education,
212 Il. App. 596 (1918) ; Minnesota Lumber Co. v. Whitebreast Coal Co., 160 Ill. 85, 43
N. E. 774 (1895) ; National Furnace Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co., 110 Ill. 427 (1884) ; Con-
nersville Wagon Co. v. McFarlan Carriage Co., 166 Ind. 123, 76 N. E. 294 (1905);
Semon, Bache & Co. v. Coppes, 35 Ind. App. 351, 74 N. E. 41 (1905) ; Smith v. Morse, 20
La. Ann. 200 (1868); Holmes Co. v. Detroit, 158 Mich. 137, 122 N. W. 506 (1909);
E. G. Dailey Co. v. Clark Can Co., 128 Mich. 591, 87 N. W. 761 (1901) ; Koehler & Hen-
richs Mercantile Co. v. Illinois Glass Co., 143 Minn. 344, 173 N. W. 703 (1919) ; Scott v.
T. W. Stevenson Co., 130 Minn. 151, 153 N. W. 316 (1915); Reeves v. Fulton Market
Refrigerating Co., 105 Misc. 130, 173 N. Y. S. 568 (1918) ; Wells v. Alexandre, 130 N. Y.
642, 29 N. E. 142 (1891) ; Cox v. Humble, 16 S. W.2d 285 (Tex. Com. App. 1929) ; Ex-
celsior Wrapping Co. v. Messinger, 116 Wis. 549, 93 N. E. 459 (1903).
3. Curtis Candy Co. v. Silberman, 45 F.2d 451 (6th Cir. 1919) ; Crane v. Crane, 105
Fed. 869 (7th Cir. 1901); Leach v. Ky. Block Channel Coal Co., 256 Fed. 686 (S.D. N.Y.
1919) ; Cohen v. Clayton Coal Co., 86 Colo. 270, 281 Pac. 111 (1929) ; Chappell v. Andrea,
41 Ga. App. 413, 153 S. E. 218 (1930) ; Joliet Bottling Co. v. Joliet Citizens Brewing Co.,
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tion for this distinction is that sellers need protection from buyers whose
requirements are uncertain, due to the nature of their business, and therefore
susceptible to an unfair increase in times of rising prices.4 It is thought that
the requirements of the manufacturer, for example, will be severely restricted
by the capacity of his production machinery ;5 whereas those of the retailer or
wholesaler will be limited largely only by the commodity market. Even so, it
can hardly be contended that the requirements of the established manufacturer
are always completely ascertainable; for if that were the case no need would
exist for this type of agreement. Thus, the test must be based on the existence
of requirements susceptible of reasonable ascertainment.6 The question then
becomes, is a non-producing business inherently lacking in this respect? Even.
cursory consideration of the problem results in the conclusion that this is not
so; for quite obviously an instance could arise where the personal knowledge
and experience of the seller in-dealing with the buyer is such as to enable him
254 Il1. 215, 98 N. E. 263 (1912) ; Fred Allen Auto Supply Co. v. Johns-Manville Co., 211
Ill. App. 217 (1918) ; Rehm-Zeiher Co. v. Walker Co., 156 Ky. 6, 160 S. W. 777 (1913) ;
Saginaw Medicine Co. v. Dykes, 210 Mo. App. 399, 238 S. W. 556 (1922) ; Schlegel v.
Cooper, 231 N. Y. 459, 132 N. E. 145 (1921) ; Pessin v. Fox Head Waukesha Corp., 230
Wis. 277, 282 N. W. 582 (1938).
4. "Plaintiffs in error were . . . in no manufacture .... They were . . . merchants
pure and simple-middlemen. . . . Should the contract under discussion be upheld, the
plaintiffs in error would be held to occupy this advantageous situation: If the prices . . .
rose, they would, by that much, increase their ratio of profits, and probably, coming into
a situation to outbid competitors, increase also, the quantum of orders." Grosscup, J.,
in Crane v. Crane, 105 Fed. 869, 872 (1901). See also Cohen v. Clayton Coal Co., 86
Colo. 270, 275, 281 Pac. 111, 114 (1929) ; Schlegel v. Cooper, 231 N. Y. 459, 463, 132
N. E. 148, 150 (1927).
There are many cases in which a buyer has attempted to make an unjust use of his
advantage, but the real reason for the decision is obscured by verbalization in terms of
"lack of mutuality." The following cases should be tested on this basis: Jenkins & Co.
v. Anaheim Sugar Co., 274 Fed. 504 (9th Cir. 1921) ; Lodenbach Fertilizer Co. v. Ten-
nessee Phosphate Co., 121 Fed. 298 (6th Cir. 1903) ; Leach v. Ky. Block Channel Coal Co.,
256 Fed. 298 (S.D. N.Y. 1919); Wickham & Burton Coal Co. v. Farmers' Lumber o.,
1.9 Iowa 1183, 179 N. W. 417 (1920) ; Andrews Coal Co. v. Directors of Public Schools,
151 La. 695, 92 So. 303 (1922) ; Nelson v. Barber, 143 La. 783, 79 So. 403 (1918) ; Wad-
dell v. Phillips, 133 Md. 497, 105 AtI. 771 (1919) ; Aschlex & Wheeler Co. v. Mandelson,
180 App. Div. 9, 167 N. Y. S. 435 (1917); Moore v. American Molasses Co., 106 Misc.
263, 174 N. Y. S. 440 (1919). See Patterson, "Illusory" Promises and Promisor's Options,
6 IowA L. BULL. 209, 211-224 (1921), reprinted in Selected Readings on the Law of Con-
tracts 417-428 (1931) ; Note, 28 COL. L. REv. 225 (1928).
5. "The capacity of the furnace, the needs of the railroad, or the requirements of the
hotel are, within certain limits, ascertainable by the vendor." Grosscup, J., in Crane v.
Crane, 105 Fed. 869, 872 (1901).
A new manufacturer would probably have to enlarge factory space, obtain more
machinery, and otherwise reorganize as much as an established manufacturer, in order to
take advantage of price increases. See, in general, Havighurst and Berman, Requirement
and Output Contracts, 27 ILL. L. REv. 1 (1932).
6. See Bailey v. Austrian, 19 Minn. 535 (1873), where the court voided a contract
because it was not possible for the seller to completely ascertain the buyer's requirements.
The case was overruled in Scott v. T. W. Stevenson Co., 130 Minn. 151, 153 N. W. 316
(1915), on the ground that reasonable ascertainment is the standard. The cases cited in
note 2 supra reveal that this is the proper test. See Levery, The Doctrine of Bailey v.
Austrian, 10 MINN. L. REv. 584 (1926).
RECENT CASES
to reasonably ascertain the latter's requirements regardless of the nature of
the business involved.
7
Also, conceding that exploitation of seller by buyer is an evil, it is doubt-
ful that it supports such a doctrinaire distinction between different types of
businesses. Requirements agreements are a direct consequence of the actual
inability of many businesses, both producing and selling, to determine their
future need for commodities,' and are not, as assumed by some courts, instru-
ments designed for the perpetration of fraud. It would be a different matter
if the fruits of a requirements contract ran to the buyer alone-if sellers were
coerced into making such agreements. When fluctuating market conditions
favor the buyer, the seller may assume some burdens he would not otherwise
undertake.' Yet, even when a buyer's market prevails, it is apparent that the
seller as well as the buyer benefits from a requirements agreement." Certainty
7. For cases in which contracts to supply the requirements of a distributor, jobber,
wholesaler, or new business have been held valid on the ground that the requirements
were reasonably ascertainable, see Brightwater Paper Co. v. Monadock Paper Mills, 161
F.2d 869 (1st Cir. 1947) ; Mills-Morris Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 7 F.2d 38 (6th
Cir. 1925) ; Texas Co. v. Pensacola Maritime Corp., 279 Fed. 19 (5th Cir. 1922) ; National
Publishing Co. v. International Paper Co., 269 Fed. 903 (2d Cir. 1920) ; Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. Neuer, 253 Fed. 161 (6th Cir. 1918) ; T. W. Jenkins Co. v. Anaheim Sugar
Co., 247 Fed. 958 (9th Cir. 1918) ; Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Jarrett, 42 F. Supp. 723
(N.D. Ga. 1942) ; Atwater & Co. v. Terminal Coal Corp., 32 F. Supp. 178 (Mass. 1940);
Match Corp. of America v. Acme Match Corp., 285 Ill. App. 197, 1 N. E.2d 867 (1936);
N. Y. Cent. Iron Works v. United States Radiator Co., 174 N. Y. 331, 66 N. E. 967
(1903) ; McMichael v. Price, 177 Okl. 186, 58 P.2d 549 (1936) ; Baker v. Murray Supply
Co., 138 Okl. 288, 279 Pac. 340 (1929).
No particular element is controlling in the determination of the seller's ability to
ascertain the buyer's requirements. See Note, 28 COL. L. REv. 223, 230 (1928). Actual
knowledge, of course, is possible. T. W. Jenkins Co. v. Anaheim Sugar Co., 247 Fed.
958 (9th Cir. 1918); American Trading Co. v. National Fibre & Insulation Co., 1
Harr. 258, 114 Atl. 67 (Del. 1921). But experience of the buyer in his business may pro-
vide a basis whereby the seller can predict the buyer's requirements, even though the latter
had never before purchased from the seller. Brightwater Paper Co. v. Monadock Paper
Mills, 161 F.2d 869 (1st Cir. 1947) ; McMichael v. Price, 177 Okl. 186, 58 P.2d 549 (1936).
8. See Havighurst and Berman, Requirement and Output Contracts, 27 ILL. L. REV.
1-3 (1932). In Walker Mfg. Co. v. Swift, 200 Fed. 529, 531 (5th Cir. 1912), the court
said with reference to a requirement contract: "Business necessities require contracts of
this class, though more or less indefinite, to be upheld." See also Levery, The Doctrine
of Bailey v. Austrian, 10 MINN. L. REv. 584 (1926).
9. See notes 3 and 4 supra.
10. See, e. g., Koehler & Henrichs Mercantile Co. v. Illinois Glass Co., 143 Minn.
344, 173 N. W. 703 (1919).
11. Of course a price risk is inherent in any contract to buy and sell for a fixed
price; and the requirements buyer does have a measure of control over the quantity he
will require. The only disadvantage to the requirements buyer will result when prices
decline. The seller, however, bears a risk of price increase and also the burden of ascer-
taining what the buyer's future requirements will be, so as to be in a position to carry
out his obligation. Unless the seller has considerable raw material on hand, bought during
a period of higher costs, he is not as likely to press the buyer to have normal requirements,
since the seller is only deprived of contract profits. But if prices increase, the seller is
more likely to want to hold the buyer down to normal requirements, unless he has on-
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of suipply is the primary inducement for the buyer. In addition a price ad-
vantage may result from quantity buying and warehousing economies. The
seller receives the benefits of an assured demand and is enabled to effect sav-
ings on selling, credit, advertising, storage, and transportation costs. 2 Thus,
the arbitrary position taken by some courts in completely denying the advant-
ages of this -important transaction to large numbers of ethical businessmen
is untenable.
It is doubtful that the fictional concept of "mutuality," as applied in the
requirements area, could sustain any other result; for "mutuality" is concerned
only with the facts at "time of making," rendering a contract either altogether
valid or entirely void at its inception. 3 It should also be apparent that
"mutuality" does not preclude the possibility of exploitation. 4 Due to the
technical nature of the law of consideration the enforcement of a contract
depends upon the manner in which it is drafted." If a seller receives a
consideration (a tom-tit) other than the buyer's promise to buy, in exchange
for his promise to sell, the doctrine of mutuality is satisfied.' Other concepts
must be called upon if subsequent injustice is to be prevented.' 7
Actually, where a buyer promises to buy all of his requirements from a
seller, the seller's promise should be enforced for any quantity the buyer
desires, insofar as the only objection to enforcement is based upon lack of
siderable raw materials obtained during a low cost period. For a discussion of the eco-
nomic elements involved, see Havighurst & Berman, Requirement and Output Contracts,
27 ILL. L. REV 1 (1932).
12. See McLaren, Related Problems of "Requirements" Contracts and Acquisitions
in Vertical Integration Under the Antitrust Laws, 45 ILL. L. REV. 141 (1950).
13. "The difficulty [with the mutuality doctrine] is that the court must purport to
make its decision on the basis of facts existing at the time the contract is entered into,
whereas probably the most significant elements center around what happens in the course
of dealing under the contract. What has happened cannot well be subordinated to specu-
lation as to what might have happened. There is, perhaps, some flexibility in the use of
the broad terms 'mutuality' and 'certainty.' . . .' But the tendency to crystallize rules for
recurring situations makes the flexibility only apparent." Havighurst & Berman, Require-
ment and Output Contracts, 27 ILL. L. REv. 1, 10 (1932)..
14. See Patterson, "Illusory" Promises and Promisor's Options, 6 IowA L. BULL. 209,
223 (1921), reprinted in Selected Readings on the Law of Contracts 427 (1931).
15. See Wright, Ought the Doctrine of Consideration to be Abolished from the
Common Law?, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1225 (1936). See also Sylvan Crest Sand & Gravel Co.
v. United States, 150 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Wood v. Lucy, 222 N. Y. 88, 118 N. E.
214 (1917).
16. Fuchs v. Motor Stage Co., 135 Ohio St. 509, 21 N. E.2d 669 (1939). As to the
confusion that has existed on this point, see Note, 24 A.L.R. 1352 (1923) and In re United
Cigar Stores Co., 8 F. Supp. 243 (S.D. N.Y. 1934). Where a distributor has promised
to buy its requirements and has also promised to push its sales and make reasonable and
good faith efforts to obtain customers, some courts have indicated that the latter promises
provide mutuality of obligation. Mills-Morris Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., F.2d 38
(6th Cir. 1925); Fred Allen Auto Supply Co. v. Johns-Manville Co., 211 Ill. App. 217
(1918) ; Schlegel v. Cooper, 231 N. Y. 459, 132 N. E. 148 (1921). But the decision is
often otherwise. Miami Coco-Cola Bottling Co. v. Orange Crush Co., 296 Fed. 693 (5th
Cir. 1924).
17. See note 13 supra.
RECENT CASES
mutuality. Such a contract imposes a definite obligation on the buyer.18
Certainly the obligation is as mutual here as it is in an option contract where
the buyer need buy nothing if he so chooses.10
The Loewus case not only emphasizes the inflexibility of the mutuality
doctrine, but also exemplifies the inadequacy of adopting an arbitrary approach
to the intricate problems confronting today's businessman. Loewus was obli-
gated to buy certain of its wine requirements exclusively from Vischia. Yet,
the New Jersey Supreme Court, rather than concern itself with Vischia's
ability to determine future obligations, or with Loewus' opportunity to take
advantage of price increase, 2 unhesitatingly accepted the artificial distinction
between types of businesses and mechanically applied the mutuality doctrine.2
By deciding that Loewus was entering a "new" business the question was
settled 2-- all that followed was automatic. The exclusion of evidence that the
contracting parties had previously discussed the buyers estimated future
requirements was, therefore, considered as immaterial. 23
A much more practical legal tool with which to check exploitation of
seller by buyer where a requirements agreement has been entered into is the
implied condition. Significantly, the proposed Uniform Commercial Code
has adopted this approach in dealing with these contracts:
A term which measures . . .the requirements of the buyer means
such actual . . . requirements as may occur in good faith, except
that no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to any stated estimate
18. Texas Co. v. Pensacola Maritime Corp., 279 Fed. 10 (5th Cir. 1922) ; In re United
Cigar Stores Co., 8 F. Supp. 243 (S.D. N.Y. 1934) ; Jenkins v. City Ice & Fuel Co., 118
Fla. 795, 160 So. 215 (1935) ; Bartlett Springs Co. v. Standard Box Co., 16 Cal. App. 671,
117 Pac. 937 (1911). See 1 WI.LISTON, CONTRACTS § 104a (rev. ed. 1937). 2 WILLISToN,
SALES § 464a (3d ed. 1948) ; Patterson, "Illusory" Promises and Promisor's Options, 6
IowA L. BULL. 209, 228 (1921), reprinted in Selected Readings in the Law of Contracts
431 (1931).
19. See, e. g., Sylvan Crest Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 150 F.2d 642 (2d Cir
1937) ; Gurfein v. Werbelovsky, 97 Conn. 703, 118 Atl. 32 (1922).
20. There were discussions between Loewus and Vischia, at the time of entering the
contract, as to Loewus's probable future requirements; and Loewus's orders, before
Vischia declared the contract terminated, were reasonably steady. See Joint Appendix,
Brief for Appellant and Respondent, p. 99a, G. Loewus & Co. v. Vischia, 65 A.2d 604
(N. J. 1949). But more interesting is the fact that Loewus had been in the wholesale
business long before the contract in question was made..
21. "[Requirement contracts are], by weight of authority, held imutual and binding
on the parties where, from the nature of the purchaser's business the quantity of the
goods needed is subject to a reasonably accurate estimate." G. Loewus & Co. v. Vischia,
65 A.2d 604, 606 (N. J. 1949). If the sale of Loewus's bottling plant had been partly "in
exchange" for Vischia's promise to sell bottled wines, a different result could have been
reached. The contract of sale and requirements were entered "separately," however.
This is enough to suggest that the law of consideration concerns itself greatly with for-
malism.
22. Although Loewus had been wholesaling bottled wines since 1895, (Joint Appen-
dix, Brief for Appellant and Respondent, p. 22a, G. Loewus & Co. v. Vischia, 65 A.2d 604
(N. 3. 1949), the court states: "A new business was created" since Loewus changed in
1942 to strictly wholesaling. G. Loewus & Co. v. Vischia, 65 A.2d 604, 609 (N. J. 1949)
23. See note 20 supra.
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or to any normal or otherwise comparable prior . . . requirements
may be demanded. [This section] applies to contracts of non-produc-
ing establishments such as dealers or distributors as well as to manu-
facturing concerns. (emphasis added) 24
The trend of modern cases is also in this direction.
25
Although all requirements agreements should be regarded as valid when
made, 26 there may be certain facts or conduct on the part of thebuyer, occuring
during the time set for performance, which would prevent the buyer from
strictly enforcing the seller's promise.2 7 Two types of implied conditions may
be utilized in this connection: the first would compel the buyer to operate his
business according to accepted commercial standards, so as to have reasonably
foreseeable requirements. A manufacturer, for example, will normally operate
without extreme fluctuations, whereas a retailer can usually be expected to
push sales whenever possible.2 8 An unreasonable deviation on the part of
either would be prima facie evidence that the requirements agreement was to
be used as an instrument for unfair price speculation .2  This, of course, as
in the case of any other type of bad faith dealing, would terminate the contract,
discharge the seller, and render the buyer liable for damages.3 0
The second type of condition would only partially relieve the seller from
his obligation. The presumption of bad faith arising from an extensive in-
24. § 2-306(1) (Spring 1950) and comment 2 (May 1949).
"By drawing into issue the 'normal requirements' and 'good faith' of the buyer,
courts have made the elements in the subsequent course of dealing material matters for
consideration. That is the advantage of this treatment. The degree of expansion of the
business, the cause of expansion, the knowledge of the seller as to the condition of the
business, the foreseeability of circumstances making the seller's performance onerous-
all these become matters of legitimate inquiry. At the same time it is possible to control
the buyer without denying all relief." Havighurst & Berman, Requirement and Output
Contracts, 27 ILL. L. REV. 1, 13 (1932).
25. Brightwater Paper Co. v. Monadock Paper Mills, 161 F.2d 869 (1st Cir. 1947);
Mills-Morris Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 7 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1925) ; Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co. v. Jarrett, 42 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. Ga. 1942) ; In re United Cigar Stores
Co., 8 F. Supp. 243 (S.D. N.Y. 1934); Match Corp. of America v. American Match
Corp., 285 Ill. App. 197, 1 N. E.2d 867 (1936) ; Jenkins v. City Ice & Fuel Co., 118 Fla.
795, 160 So. 215 (1935). Also compare annotation in 14 A.L.R. 1300 (1921) with anno-
tat'ons in 24 A.L.R. 1352 (1923) and 74 A.L.R. 476 (1931).
26. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACrS § 44 (rev. ed. 1937). See also Patterson, "Illusory"
Promises and Pronisor's Options, 6 IowA L. BULL. 209 (1921), reprinted in Selected
Readings on. the Law of Contracts 415 et seq. (1931). "The damage may be uncertain,
especially if the buyer is a wholesaler or distributor or engaged in a new business, so that
an award of substantial damages may not be feasible, but the existence of a valid contract
is clear." Jenkins v. City Ice & Fuel Co., 118 Fla. 795, 797, 160 So. 215, 216 (1935).
27. See note 24 supra.
28. The proposed Uniform Commercial Code § 2-306, comment 2 (May, 1949) states:
. the party who will determine quantity, is required to operate his plant or conduct
his business in good faith and according to commercial standards so that his . . . require-
ments will approximate a reasonably foreseeable figure."
29. See Mills-Morris Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 7 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1925).
30. See N. Y. Cent. Iron Works Co. v. United States Radiator Co., 174 N. Y. 331,
66 N. E. 967 (1903).
RECENT CASES
crease in requirements should be rebutted if the buyer can show that he had no
intention of taking an unfair advantage of price increases.. In such a case
the seller should not be discharged from his obligation entirely, but only from
that part which to him was unforseeable.3 ' Relevant to this determination
are previous or normal requirements prior to the formation of the contract."
A prior estimate would be of particular importance in cases involving a new
business having no previous requirements.
The intricacies of modern business make requirements agreements a near
necessity. They are beneficial not only to the immediate parties, but to the
consuming public as well ;33 and since harm results only through subsequent
fraudulent manipulations, any device which places these agreements in their
true perspective should be employed.3 4 To be effective, a court's application
of commercial law governing the everyday affairs of businessmen must be
tempered by a thorough understanding of good business practice and commer-
cial standards."3
31. William C. Atwater & Co. v. Terminal Coal Corp., 32 F. Supp. 178 (Mass. 1940);
In re United Cigar Stores Co., 8 F. Supp. 243 (S.D. N.Y. 1934) ; Southwest Natural Gas
Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 102 F.2d 630 (10th Cir. 1939), cited with approval
in proposed Commercial Code § 2-306, comment 2 (May, 1949). See also 2 WILLISTON,
SALES § 264 (3d ed. 1948).
32. Chalmers & Williams v. Walter Bledsoe & Co., 218 Ill. App. 363 (1920); Scott
v. Stevenson Co., 130 Minn. 151, 153 N. W. 316 (1915).
33. See note 8 supra.
34. See note 13 supra.
35. The proposed Commercial Code § 2-306, comment 1 (May, 1949), states that the
general approach of the Code "requires the reading of commercial background and intent
into the language of any agreement and demands good faith in the performance of that
agreement." See Comment, 62 Hav. L. REv. 1376 (1949), for an enlightening discussion
of private lawmaking by trade associations.
